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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 03-2342

JAMES MCCAULEY,
o/b/o
DEBORAH MCCAULEY, deceased
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 01-04953)
Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise, District Judge

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 22, 2004
BEFORE: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, and ROSENN and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 23, 2004)

OPINION OF THE COURT

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
This matter comes on before this court on appeal from an order entered in the
district court on March 11, 2003, affirming a decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security denying decedent Deborah McCauley’s claim for disability payments. Even
though Deborah McCauley died on April 11, 1997, and her husband is prosecuting these
proceedings, as a matter of convenience we refer to the plaintiff-appellant simply as
McCauley. The parties are familiar with the facts so we do not set them forth at length.
The appeal is unusual in that the Commissioner confesses error and requests that we
remand the case for further proceedings.
The following procedural steps were taken in this case. McCauley applied for
disability benefits on January 18, 1995. The Commissioner denied her application
initially and on reconsideration following which McCauley requested a hearing which
was held on July 8, 1996. After an ALJ made a decision that McCauley was not disabled
she successfully sought review from the Appeals Council which remanded the matter.
Subsequently, on December 17, 1998, there was a new hearing before a different ALJ
who on June 17, 1999, issued a new decision denying benefits at the second step of the
familiar five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is
under a disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1180
(3d Cir. 1992). McCauley then again sought review before the Appeals Council but this
time she was not successful and thus the ALJ’s decision became final.
McCauley then instituted an action in the district court seeking review of the final
decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Eventually the district court entered an order
affirming the Commissioner on M arch 11, 2003, following which M cCauley appealed to
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this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the order of the
district court, see Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000), and plenary review
over legal questions, see Krysztoforski v. Chater, 55 F.3d 857, 858 (3d Cir. 1995). While
we routinely review the factual component of a decision of the Commissioner to
determine if it is supported by substantial evidence, see Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 390, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1422 (1971), that principle is of limited significance here as the
ALJ denied McCauley’s claim at the second step of the sequential evaluation process and
we are reversing the district court’s decision affirming that disposition and directing a
remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings. Thus, except for the finding at the
first step of the sequential analysis, i.e., McCauley was not engaging in substantial
activity, a finding she obviously accepts, we do not have factual findings to review.
The determination that we must make is whether we should direct the district court
to order an award of benefits, as McCauley urges, or whether we should direct that court
to remand the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings, as she urges. We are
satisfied that even though there has been a substantial record developed here, still the
record should be expanded further by the retention of a medical expert by the ALJ,
because, as the Commissioner acknowledges, and as our opinion in Newell v.
Commissioner, 347 F.3d 541 (3d Cir. 2003), makes clear, the date of McCauley’s
disability if she is found to be disabled is potentially significant. Appellee’s br. at 12.
See also Appellant’s br. at 43 n.10. Moreover, the Commissioner in the first instance
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should consider the impact of McCauley’s morbid obesity which she acknowledges is a
germane factor. Appellee’s br. at 13.
In reaching our result we point out that our opinion in Newell was not rendered
before the district court’s disposition of this case and thus the parties did not have the
benefit of it at any stage of the proceedings in this case prior to this appeal. Indeed, we
had not even decided the earlier case of Beasich v. Commissioner, 66 Fed. Appx. 419,
2003 WL 21299604, No. 02-3627 (3d Cir. June 6, 2003), a not precedential opinion on
which McCauley relies and which is similar to Newell, until after the district court ruled
in this matter. Certainly on the remand the Commissioner should consider Newell.
For the foregoing reasons we will vacate the order of M arch 11, 2003, and will
remand the case to the district court which in turn should remand it to the Commissioner
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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